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History, Norms and Conflicting
Loyalties in the Office of Attorney
General
by Nancy Virginia Baker, Ph.D. *
I. INTRODUCTION
A sincere thank you to Patrick Longan and Mercer Law Review for
organizing this timely and important symposium on ethics and
professionalism in the Office of the U.S. Attorney General. It is such a
fascinating office to study, at the nexus of law and politics.
I was a college undergraduate during Watergate, when I first became
aware there was an office of attorney general. In graduate school, my
interest in it piqued when Edwin Meese was nominated by Ronald
Reagan. From then on, I have focused my research on the U.S. Attorney
General, especially the duality inherent in the office. Where does or
should an attorney general’s loyalty lie: with the President or with the
law? Can, in fact, the two be separated? After all, the Attorney General
exercises power delegated by the President. Many of the Attorney
General’s roles are political and administrative, not simply legal.
Further, in a democracy, the political process is what makes
government accountable. Yet, the office is unique among executive
agencies and operates under different expectations. To ensure public
trust in the fair administration of justice, which is an essential
attribute of a stable democracy, law officers follow certain longstanding
norms of the office.
A review of historical antecedents will provide some background for
understanding how the office developed and what norms developed to
serve the public trust.

* Professor Emerita of Government, New Mexico State University. San Jose State
University (B.A., 1974); Tulane University (Ph.D., 1989).
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY
The Attorney General is one of the institutions of American
government consciously drawn from an ancient English office, evolving
over the centuries in response to political and economic changes
brought by trade, colonization, and the English civil war. By the time
the colonies were established, the English office had assumed many of
its modern attributes: it was centralized, served government as a
whole—not simply the monarch—and had both legal and political
responsibilities. Colonial governors appointed attorneys general early
on, with the first one—in Virginia in 1643—just thirty-six years after
the settlement at Jamestown. By the end of the seventeenth century,
almost all of the thirteen colonies had attorneys general, and the ones
that did not shared legal officers with neighboring colonies.1
Colonial attorneys general were not formally independent of the
English Attorney General, who remained the de jure law officer. But
because of the great distances involved, the Crown’s control was
nominal. In some cases, colonial law officers had broader
responsibilities than their English superior. Early on, for example,
colonial attorneys general handled all criminal prosecutions. This was
not the case in Britain, where the Attorney General conducted only
those prosecutions important to the Crown, leaving routine criminal
cases up to the victims to pursue.2
Colonial attorneys general varied on the question of the source of
their authority, whether they served the king, the Attorney General
back in England, or the colonial governor. A few began to see
themselves as serving a broader interest. In the colony of Maryland, for
example, the Attorney General was considered to serve “the Publick”
when his actions related “to the Liberty of the Inhabitants or their
Possessions.”3
This view spread as some colonists began to resent their appointed
governors. An illustration of the tension between the Attorney General
and the Governor occurred in the mid-eighteenth century, when Peyton
Randolph, Virginia’s Attorney General, quarreled with the Governor
over his plan to assess a fee to certify land grants. Randolph believed
the order to be unlawful; it had not been authorized by the colonial
assembly. The Governor disagreed. Randolph left for London to argue
the case before Crown authorities. The Governor retaliated by replacing
1 NANCY VIRGINIA BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE 1789–1990, 38–40 (1992).
2 JOHN LL. J. EDWARDS, THE LAW OFFICERS OF THE CROWN 9 (1964).
3 OLIVER W. HAMMONDS, The Attorney General in the American Colonies, 5.1
ANGLO-AM LEGAL HIST, 3–4 (New York University School of Law, 1939).
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him with George Wythe. But the Governor had misread Wythe, who
gave the post back to Randolph as soon as he returned. Wythe was the
country’s first law professor, and both he and Randolph later became
active in revolutionary politics.4
By 1776, a fairly coherent system of law officers and courts existed in
the colonies. Because of this history, the transition from colonial to
state legal systems went fairly smoothly. Every state except
Connecticut made express provision for an attorney general, either in
their constitutions or by statute. Some states—such as New York—
designated the Attorney General as the representative of the people,
not the government.5
There was no national Attorney General at this time, although the
Continental Congress considered appointing one. The proposed law
officer would have had the duty of prosecuting suits and giving advice
“on all such matters as shall be referred to him by Congress.”6 No action
was taken on the proposal, leaving the Continental Congress to engage
private attorneys to prosecute on its behalf in the state courts, generally
over debts incurred during the Revolutionary War. This was fine with
many legislators, who were suspicious of a national government.7
This suspicion began to wane by the time of the Constitutional
Convention in 1787. Even so, neither in debates nor in the text of the
Constitution was an attorney general for the new nation mentioned.
The Constitution did pave the way for one, though. First, Article II
implies a need for an attorney general to provide advice to the
President, especially to ensure that the President “shall take [c]are that
the [l]aws be faithfully executed.”8 Second, the division of power
between the branches and between national and state governments
meant that national adjudication was inevitable. For this, a lawyer
representing the U.S. government in court would be needed.
The first bill introduced in the U.S. Senate proposed an office of
Attorney General along with the lower federal court system. The bill
was assigned to a committee on the second day of business but then it
stalled. Anti-federalist members resisted nationalizing courts and legal
4 EDMUND

RANDOLPH, HISTORY OF VIRGINIA 161–62, 183 (1970).
supra note 3, at 10, 22.
6 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789 19, 155–56 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1912).
7 James Hightower, From Attornatus to Department of Justice—An Historical
Perspective of the Nature of the Attorney Generalship of the United States as Embodied in
the Department of Justice Act of 1870, in REMOVING POLITICS FROM THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEPARATION OF POWERS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE 408–409 (1974).
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
5 HAMMONDS,
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issues. A concurrent congressional debate on the Bill of Rights
re-invigorated their commitment to state sovereignty. Finally, the
Judiciary Act of 17899 passed, but only after the statutes creating the
Departments of State, War and Treasury. The relevant part reads:
And there shall be appointed . . . a meet person learned in the law to
act as attorney for the United States . . . who shall be sworn or
affirmed to a faithful execution of his office, whose duty it shall be to
prosecute . . . and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which
the United States shall be concerned, and to give his advice and
opinion upon questions of law when required by the President of the
United States, or when requested by the heads of any of the
departments, touching any matters that may concern their
departments, and shall receive such compensation for his services as
shall by law be provided.10

The Act identifies the Attorney General’s client as the United
States, not the U.S. President or Executive branch. While the method of
appointment is not specified, it was understood to provide for
presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate, as
with other executive officers. Draft versions indicated the Attorney
General was to be appointed by the district courts. This was not a
radical proposition: state attorneys general often were associated with
the judiciary. Some anti-federalist senators, however, objected to court
appointment. As Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania argued, it
would “draw by degrees all law business into the Federal Courts.”11
In important ways, the Act distinguishes the Attorney General from
other executive officers, with duties distinctly legal in character. The
Attorney General would be chief law officer of the nation, officer of the
court, and legal adviser, as well as member of an elected
administration. As one scholar explained, that made the office “a
unique bridge between the executive and judicial branches.”12
On a more mundane level, another difference existed between the
law officer and other executive heads—the lack of formal structure.
Unlike their cabinet peers, the earliest attorneys general were
part-time and had no staff or even offices. For the first three decades,
attorneys general served without transcribing clerks, filing system or
desk. They even had to pay for their own heating fuel and stationery, a
9 An

Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
Id. at § 35 (1789).
11 Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
HARV. L. REV. 109 (1923).
12 DANIEL J. MEADOR, THE PRESIDENT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE 26 (1980).
10
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situation that Congress resisted rectifying.13 The result was that many
early law officers continued their private practices in their hometowns,
only occasionally traveling to the nation’s capital. This made sense
when there was little federal law or litigation. But things began to
change as the nation grew and its law business expanded.
To place the Attorney General on par with other Executive branch
officers, the issue of residency had to be resolved first. Living outside of
the Capitol, the chief law officer was seldom available for cabinet
meetings or legal advice, playing a limited role in White House affairs.
Both Presidents James Madison and James Monroe tried to entice their
attorneys general to move to D.C., with Monroe reasoning that “[t]he
Attorney General has been always, since the adoption of our
Government, a member of the executive council.”14 With the
appointment of William Wirt in 1817, Monroe finally had success. Wirt
moved to Washington and served as Attorney General for twelve years,
the longest tenure to date.15
The office, however, remained primarily a legal one. Because
attorneys general received half of the salary of other executive officers,
they were expected to maintain their private law practices. Far from
being seen as a conflict of interest, private practices brought important
benefits, keeping attorneys general abreast of the law and sharpening
their legal skills. Acting as private counsel, attorneys general argued
some of the most famous early cases before the Supreme Court of the
United States: Gibbons v. Ogden,16 Luther v. Borden,17 Dartmouth
College v. Woodward,18 Barron v. Baltimore19 and Chisholm v.
Georgia.20
This changed in 1853. As soon as his salary was increased to match
that of other cabinet officers, Caleb Cushing, Franklin Pierce’s new law
officer, took it as a mandate to serve full-time. This brought him into
closer proximity to the President and enabled him to expand his
portfolio into policy areas, increasing the status and visibility of the
office. Cushing had the time, as well as inclination, to become active in
13 Letter from Mr. Monroe to Mr. Lowndes, Chairman of the House Committee of Ways
and Means, Am State Papers, 1801–1823, 417–419 (1834).
14 Id. at 418.
15 BAKER, supra note 1, at 56–57.
16 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
17 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
18 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
19 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
20
2 U.S. 419 (1793); HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE:
CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 31, 62, 154–55 (The
Macmillan Company, 1937).
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a broad range of governmental activities, including some that had
previously been handled by the Secretary of State.21
The creation of the Department of Justice added administrative
responsibilities to the Attorney General’s office. Incumbents began to
refer to themselves as heading a law department even before the start
of the Civil War. In reality, the “department” in the 1850s comprised an
Attorney General, two clerks and a messenger. With the war came an
explosion of federal litigation, to which Congress responded by adding
two legal assistants and a law clerk. The post-war legal environment
was even more challenging. The Attorney General did not have the
resources to handle litigation around the country that addressed
everything from personal rights to property titles. To meet the
increased demand, the federal government hired private attorneys to
represent the nation’s interests. These private attorneys charged
prevailing professional rates, and the costs incurred were close to half a
million dollars over four years.22 Added to this, other government
attorneys who appeared in court occasionally took contradictory
positions to that of the Attorney General. Some were U.S. district
attorneys, over whom the Attorney General had no real supervisory
power; others were counselors in other executive departments.
Confusion as to the government’s actual position ensued. In the Gray
Jacket23 case, the Supreme Court insisted that the government present
a unified legal position through the Office of the Attorney General.24
These factors finally motivated Congress to establish the
Department of Justice in 1870.25 The statute added two more assistants,
as well as a solicitor general to share the Supreme Court caseload with
the Attorney General. It also expanded administrative responsibilities,
consolidated more of the government’s legal business, and paved the
way for the DOJ’s broader role in law enforcement.26
Through the early twentieth century, federal law began to reach into
more areas, including regulation and antitrust. However, the Attorney
General’s duties remained somewhat limited because, with few
exceptions, the presidency itself remained limited. Congress was the
21 CLAUDE M. FUESS, THE LIFE OF CALEB CUSHING 136–37 (Harcourt, Brace and
Company, 1923).
22 BAKER, supra note 1, at 60–62. Comparing private versus government salaries is
instructive. When Edwin Stanton was a private attorney in 1859, he earned an annual
salary of $40,000. A year later, as James Buchanan’s attorney general, he earned a mere
$8,000.
23 72 U.S. 370 (1866).
24 See id.
25 Act to Establish the Department of Justice, 16 Stat. 162 (1870).
26 BAKER, supra note 1, at 63–64.

CONFLICTING LOYALTIES

2021

839

dominant actor in the U.S. system of government. Not until the
inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) in 1933 did the center of
political power shift definitively toward the Oval Office. The deep
economic depression and then world war necessitated national action,
which FDR embraced.
Political scientists refer to 1933 as the start of the Modern
Presidency, with the White House increasingly leading the domestic
and international policy agenda. The Cold War brought new security
challenges that further centralized power. Television increased media
coverage of the White House. Congress itself began to expect the
administration to set the legislative agenda. These developments in
turn generated increased attention on the Attorney General’s office, as
more and more legal issues moved from state arenas to the national
stage. Nowhere was this more evident than in the need to address the
demands of a growing civil rights movement.
Throughout this 231-year history, the legal, political, and
administrative duties of the office have grown. The majority of the
eighty-four attorneys general who served as of 202027 have sought to
uphold public faith in the fair administration of justice, regardless of
their party or ideology.
III. THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
A key means of ensuring the fair administration of justice has been
abiding by professional guidelines and norms that embody the essential
values that undergird the constitutional system.
A. Professional Guidelines
Over the years, attorneys general have adopted guidelines and
general rules to ensure that their advisory role falls within the
statutory authority granted in 1789. Many of these guidelines echo
similar ones used by the judiciary:
•

Attorneys general do not give advice to Congress except in
their capacity as department heads called to testify. This
rule has existed since 1820, when Wirt argued that the
Judiciary Act made the Attorney General an executive
officer, not legislative.

27 The eighty-four appointments include two law officers who were appointed twice:
John Crittenden in 1841 and 1850, and William Barr in 1991 and 2019. A few other
attorneys general have stayed on in a consecutive administration and therefore are not
counted as new appointments.
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•

Attorneys general only advise other executive department
heads on questions of law, ones that pose real, not
hypothetical, legal issues. Further, the request must come
from the department head, not a subordinate officer.

•

Attorneys general adhere to the principle of stare decisis
when issuing opinions, generally abiding by those of
predecessors in analogous cases. This principle was well
expressed by the Office of Legal Counsel under Reagan’s
first Attorney General, William French Smith: “The
Department of Justice has a duty to defend the
constitutionality of an Act of Congress whenever a
reasonable argument can be made in its support . . . .”28 This
rule seeks to minimize confusion or ambiguity in the law,
which is crucial since many of the issues addressed by the
Justice Department never end up in court.29

•

Attorneys general avoid ruling on the constitutionality of
legislation once it is enacted. The rule does not apply to
pending legislation. One of FDR’s law officers, Francis
Biddle, explained, “[I]t is not within the [Attorney General’s]
province to declare an act of the Congress unconstitutional—
at least where it does not involve any conflict between the
prerogatives of the legislative and those of the executive
departments.”30

In some recent administrations, adherence to these guidelines has
softened. For example, in 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder, Barack
Obama’s first law officer, announced that a section of the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA) was unconstitutional, and the Department of
Justice would no longer defend it in court.31 The Act’s supporters
blasted Holder, calling his action “[a] shameful moment in politicized
government lawyering . . . .”32 After two years, the Supreme Court
28 Letter from William French Smith, Attorney General, to Strom Thurmond & Joseph
R.
Biden
Jr.,
Senate
Judiciary
Comm.
Chairmen
(Apr.
6,
1981),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/1981/04/31/op-olc-v005-p0025_0.pdf.
29 Dee Ashley Akers, The Advisory Opinion Function of the Attorney General, 38 KENT.
L. J. 561 (1950).
30 40 OFFICIAL OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 160 (United States Government
Printing Office, 1949).
31 Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolbert, In Shift, U.S. Says Marriage Act Blocks Gay
TIMES
(Feb.
24,
2011),
Rights,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/us/24marriage.html.
32 David R. Lurie, William Barr Obliterated the DOJ’s Standard for Defending Laws
Because Donald Trump Asked, SLATE (April 12, 2019), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2019/04/william-barr-aca-lawsuit-donald-trump-doj.html.
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agreed with the Attorney General’s interpretation and struck down
DOMA.33
B. Norms of the Office
Of greater consequence than professional guidelines are the norms
that have developed around the Office of the Attorney General. Norms
provide the foundation on which the legitimacy of legal authority rests,
and “[c]itizens who view legal authority as legitimate are generally
more likely to comply with the law.”34
Unlike the principles outlined above, norms are not self-created.
They develop over time, drawn from long-standing Anglo-American
traditions respecting the rule of law and notions of justice. No statutory
penalties exist for violators. Instead, attorneys general who break
norms, but not criminal law, at most may face congressional sanctions.
Even then, the harshest sanctions may not be felt by the offending
Attorney General, but by later attorneys general facing skeptical
senators. Attorneys general take norms seriously not because of
negative
personal
consequences,
but
negative
institutional
consequences. Their concern is to secure public confidence in the
administration of justice. The primary norms follow.
1. Independence
The first, and probably oldest, norm is that of independence from
inappropriate political intervention into legal matters. Department of
Justice must be free to make its own determinations, based on the law
and not political favoritism. Neither the President nor powerful
members of Congress may force the department to undertake criminal
investigations or bring prosecutions, especially against their political
rivals. It does not mean that the Attorney General rejects all guidance
from the Oval Office. Presidents are elected in part to advance their law
enforcement policy agendas. Ronald Reagan’s first Attorney General
explained, “Simply put, consistent with the Constitution and the laws of
the United States, the Department of Justice intends to play an active
role in effecting the principles upon which Ronald Reagan
campaigned.”35
Since the Watergate era, specific safeguards have been adopted. A
president may be briefed on nationally important cases but not given
U.S. v. Windsor, 504 U.S. 744 (2013).
R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 62 (1990).
35 William French Smith, Attorney General, Remarks of the Attorney General Before
the
Federal
Legal
Counsel
(Oct.
29,
1981),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/10-29-1981.pdf.
33

34 TOM
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details about particular investigations. This is especially so when an
investigation is politically sensitive.36 Further, public announcements
about an investigation should not be made until the investigation is
completed and indictments are brought.
Some administrations also have sought to shield line prosecutors
from political pressure. This began in 1978, when Jimmy Carter’s
Attorney General, Griffin Bell, established a policy that all inquiries
from the White House staff or Congress could only be raised with the
Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or the Associate
Attorney General. Requests for formal legal advice had to go to the
Attorney General or Office of Legal Counsel.37 The policy was intended
to insulate assistant attorneys general, U.S. attorneys and heads of
investigative agencies from politics. Bell’s successor, Benjamin Civiletti,
followed the same guidelines. Early in the Reagan administration, the
White House Counsel put a similar policy in place, as did the
administration of George H.W. Bush. Later, Bush’s former Attorney
General, Bill Barr, advised Alberto Gonzales, George W. Bush’s White
House Counsel, to adopt what he called the Reagan rules. He told
Gonzales to “Start out very tight, and then as people start getting
judgment and they understand what’s right and what’s wrong, you can
loosen up a little bit.”38
When an Attorney General is implicated in serious violations of the
norm of independence, the Senate may consider legislation to enforce it.
That occurred twice in the aftermath of administration scandals.
The first time was in 1924. Warren G. Harding’s Attorney General,
Harry Daugherty, was not directly implicated in the worst
administration scandal, which involved the selling of Teapot Dome oil
leases. But that scandal brought unwelcome attention to how
Daugherty did business at the DOJ. Senate investigators found credible
allegations of his wrongdoing: obstruction of justice, failure to prosecute
illegal monopolies, fraud, and selling jobs, including judgeships. Adding
to the appearance of impropriety, Daugherty had large unexplained
sums of money in his bank account.39 In response to their investigation,
senators considered removing the office from politics. In the words of
36 Amy Gardner et al., Barr Said to Have Told Trump About Investigation into
POST
(Sept.
25,
2020),
Discarded
Pennsylvania
Ballots,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/barr-trump-pennsylvania-ballotsinvestigation/2020/09/25/5e4990a0-ff3b-11ea-b555-4d71a9254f4b_story.html.
37 Interview with Griffin Bell in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 21, 1987).
38 Interview by James S. Young, Daniel J. Meador, Russell L. Riley, and Nancy V.
Baker with William P. Barr in Charlottesville, Va. (Apr. 5, 2001).
39 JAMES GIGLIO, H. M. DAUGHERTY AND THE POLITICS OF EXPEDIENCY 176, 181–93
(1978).
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one senator, “[t]he Department of Justice is the one department in the
[g]overnment . . . that ought to enforce the law impartially, regardless
of political affiliation.”40
The solution the senators adopted was the creation of an Assistant
Attorney General to handle criminal cases, and another to handle civil.
They believed that removing the Attorney General from direct control
over civil and criminal cases would depoliticize the DOJ.41
The Watergate scandal also prompted a reexamination of the
independence of the Attorney General. Watergate refers to the break-in
and cover-up of Democratic campaign offices during the 1972
presidential election by Richard Nixon’s campaign operatives. His
Attorney General, John Mitchell, was implicated in both. As the sitting
law officer, he began acting as campaign manager months before he
resigned to run the campaign full-time. Mitchell was still at the DOJ
when the reelection campaign’s so-called “dirty tricks” were planned. In
battling the President’s political enemies, Mitchell later testified that
his actions were justified.42 A federal grand jury did not agree. He was
indicted on six counts involving obstruction of justice and perjury and
was convicted on five of them. He served nineteen months in prison.43
One outcome of the scandal was the creation of the Office of
Professional Responsibility in the DOJ in 1975. Its primary mission “is
to ensure that Department attorneys perform their duties in accordance
with the highest professional standards as would be expected of the
nation’s principal law enforcement agency.”44 It investigates misconduct
allegations brought against DOJ attorneys, prosecutors and
immigration judges, but not specifically the Attorney General.45
Another outcome were hearings by a Senate subcommittee on two
bills proposing to remove the Attorney General from presidential
control. The author of one bill, Senator Sam Ervin, observed sharply
that “the Department of Justice . . . all too often makes its ruling on

40 Senate Hearings before the Select Committee on Investigation of Attorney General
Harry M. Daugherty, Part 9, 68th Cong. 2565 (1924).
41 GIGLIO, supra note 39, at 190.
42 Watergate Hearings: Proceedings of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential
Campaign Activities, 366–73, 389–90, 392 (New York Times staff ed., 1973).
43 Watergate Special Prosecution Force Report 52, 156 (1975); United States v. Mitchell,
389 F. Supp. 917 (1975); Mitchell et al. v. Sirica, 377 F. Supp. 1312 (1974).
44 OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
https://www.justice.gov/opr (last visited Feb. 11, 2021).
45 Standards of Conduct, 1-4.300 - Reporting Attorney Professional Misconduct and
Related Law Enforcement Misconduct to the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR),
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Sept. 2018), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-1-4000standards-conduct.
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constitutional and legal questions harmonize with the political desires
of the White House . . . .”46 Neither proposal passed.47
The damage that Watergate did to the credibility of the DOJ lasted
for years, and constrained both of Nixon’s immediate successors, Gerald
Ford and Jimmy Carter. Ford described what he was looking for in an
attorney general: “[S]omeone of unquestioned integrity and impeccable
legal abilities and background and [who] ought to come from outside the
traditional political arena.”48 He selected a renowned legal scholar and
academic, Edward Levi. Carter, during his campaign, also pledged as
an independent Attorney General. His nominee, Griffin Bell, a former
federal judge, assured senators he and the President shared the
determination that “the Justice Department would be operated on a
nonpolitical basis.”49
2. Nonpartisanship
The second important norm is nonpartisanship, because partisan
activism undermines public confidence in the impartial administration
of justice. Especially since the Watergate scandal, “[P]residents and
attorneys general have typically sought a separation between the White
House and the Justice Department to preserve the appearance that
justice is meted out fairly, regardless of political affiliation.”50 As with
the norm of independence, even the perception of breaking the norm
can be damaging.
Attorneys general were expressly prohibited from engaging in
political activity by President Grover Cleveland in 1886, and later by
Attorney General John Sargent in 1926, in response to scandals that
rocked the government in the early 1880s and 1920s, respectively.51
Similarly, in the wake of Watergate, both Ford and Carter exempted
their attorneys general from campaign activity. In 1977, Congress also
debated barring anyone “who had served as a high-level campaign
adviser to the President” from being appointed attorney or deputy

SAM ERVIN JR., THE WHOLE TRUTH: THE WATERGATE CONSPIRACY 118–19 (1980).
The arguments against an attorney general removed from politics will be explored in
the conclusion to this paper.
48 Gerald R. Ford, Attorney General Edward H. Levi, 52 CHI. L. REV. 284 (1985).
49 Senate Judiciary Committee: Hearings on the Nomination of Griffin Bell to be
Attorney General, 95th Cong. 33 (1977).
50 Katie Benner, Barr’s Approach Closes Gap Between Justice Dept. and the White
House,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
25,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/25/us/politics/william-barr-justice-department.html.
51 CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 20, at 499–500.
46
47
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attorney general.52 The bill passed the Senate in 1977 but was deleted
during conference committee with the House.53
The norm of nonpartisanship gave rise to the Department of Justice
policy of avoiding action that could affect an election outcome within
sixty days of the election. This was the basis for much of the criticism
aimed at FBI Director James Comey after he informed Congress that
the agency was reopening its investigation into Hillary Clinton’s email
server days before the 2016 election. A former senior DOJ official
colloquially explained the rule, “[Y]ou don’t publicly announce that
you’re conducting a criminal investigation against someone. And you
especially don’t do it if that person is a candidate, 11 days before an
election. That’s true whether it’s a presidential election or an election
for dog catcher.”54
Maintaining
nonpartisanship—and
the
appearance
of
nonpartisanship—can present a challenge. Many appointees have had
politically active pasts. Seventeen attorneys general have been in the
U.S. Senate and almost as many in the House. Several modern
Presidents named either a campaign manager or national party
chairman as Attorney General sometime during their administrations.
That includes Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower,
John Kennedy, Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan.55
Once in the DOJ, however, attorneys general are expected to adhere
to partisan neutrality. The Justice Manual affirms that the DOJ’s
actions “must be impartial and insulated from political influence,” and
its prosecutorial powers “exercised free from partisan consideration.”56
Most of those with political pasts have been sensitive to any charge
that they are political tools of the President and take pains to insulate
their departments from charges of partisanship. One, however, is
remarkable for his seemingly cavalier attitude about the norm. John
Mitchell was not only Nixon’s campaign director in 1968, he began to
direct the reelection effort months before he left the DOJ.57 Mitchell
may have been oblivious to the norms of politics because he had little
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 1977, 581 (1977).
at 581, 584 (1977).
54 Laura Wagner, FBI Head Under Fire for Clinton Email Scrutiny Days Before
Election,
NPR
(Oct.
29,
2016),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/10/29/499868601/fbi-head-under-fire-for-restarting-clinton-email-investigationdays-before-elect.
55 BAKER, supra note 1, at 20–21.
56 DOJ Alumni Statement on the Events Surrounding the Sentencing of Roger Stone,
DOJ ALUMNI (Feb. 16, 2020), https://medium.com/@dojalumni/doj-alumni-statement-onthe-events-surrounding-the-sentencing-of-roger-stone-c2cb75ae4937.
57 Watergate Hearings, supra note 42, at 387–88.
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partisan experience except on Nixon’s campaigns. Ironically, some
observers have noted that the Watergate crimes may not have occurred
had Nixon turned to the Republican National Committee for campaign
help rather than his own close aides and associates.58
3. Loyalty
The third norm is loyalty to presidents in their official capacities. The
President is elected; attorneys general are appointed to help them fulfill
their constitutional duties. Loyalty is a majoritarian principle, ensuring
that an elected President’s priorities inform departmental
decision-making. Yet an attorney general’s loyalty can trigger distrust
among other political actors. As Senator Alan Cranston observed in
1974, “even our best attorneys general have never been free from
suspicions that because they are political appointees of the President,
they will be loyal to him over any other call of duty.”59
Loyalty to the President is not per se a corrupting influence. On the
contrary, it can enable an attorney general to be a trusted adviser, able
to disagree without being seen as disloyal. For example, the trust
between President Eisenhower and his Attorney General, Herbert
Brownell, enabled Eisenhower to sign off on the Department of Justice’s
effort to enforce school desegregation in New Orleans in 1960.60 Trust
also was an important factor in Robert Kennedy’s decision to join the
DOJ. His father urged him to accept his brother’s offer of the attorney
generalship, against Bobby’s preference for a lower profile position at
State. His father insisted that “John Kennedy needed someone in the
cabinet whom he knew intimately and trusted utterly.”61 Later, Edwin
Meese III was described as “Reagan’s Bobby Kennedy” because he was
so close to Ronald Reagan and trusted on such a broad range of issues.62
Without that trust, a president may sideline an attorney general on
important legal matters, turning instead to the White House Counsel
and or legal advisers in other departments. In rare cases, the President
may opt for a more sympathetic head of the DOJ. Donald Trump, for
example, replaced his first Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, after
ERVIN, supra note 46, at vii.
Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings before the S.
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 2803 and S. 2978,
93d Cong. 6 (1974).
60 Harold R. Tyler Jr., The Attorney General of the United States: Counsel to the
President or to the Government? 45 ALB. L. REV. 8 (1980).
61 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., ROBERT KENNEDY AND HIS TIMES 231 (1978).
62 Burt Solomon, Meese Sets Ambitious Agenda That Challenges Fundamental Legal
Beliefs, 17 NATIONAL J. 2640; John A. Jenkins, Mr. Power: Attorney General Meese Is
Reagan’s Man to Lead the Conservative Charge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 1986), at 19.
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repeatedly characterizing him as disloyal for recusing himself from
overseeing the Mueller probe.63 Sessions’ recusal was the appropriate
course of action, yet the President did not see it that way, calling the
recusal “very unfair to the president.”64 He continued the attacks even
after Sessions left office on November 17, 2018.65
Janet Reno’s tenure as Attorney General provides a case study in
how debates about loyalty may hinge on political calculations. Reno was
not Clinton’s first choice or his second to head the DOJ. When the first
two had to withdraw from consideration, he turned to others for
recommendations. Reno, Miami-Dade County’s prosecutor for fifteen
years, was mentioned in glowing terms. Clinton selected her, noting at
the time she “[p]ossesses one quality most essential to being Attorney
General—unquestioned integrity.”66
But she was an outsider, both to the Capitol and to the Clintons, and
questions about her loyalty dogged her from the start. Bernie
Nussbaum, Clinton’s White House Counsel, described her as “very
standoffish, very self-protective, very proper.”67 She was criticized
heavily for naming four independent counsel probes of the
administration, leading some unnamed White House aides to charge
she was insufficiently loyal to the President.68
Ironically, she appointed the first special prosecutor at the
President’s direction in 1993. The President hoped that an investigation
would quickly put questions about the Whitewater land deal to rest.
However, when the new independent counsel law passed, a three-judge
panel of the Special Division of the United States Court of Appeals
named a new Whitewater counsel, Kenneth Starr.69 His investigation
63 Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Humiliated Sessions After Mueller
TIMES
(Sept.
14,
2017),
Appointment,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/14/us/politics/jeff-sessions-trump.html.
64 Quotation of the Day: Trump Lashes Out at Russia Inquiry and Its Overseers, N.Y.
TIMES (July 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/todayspaper/quotation-of-theday-trump-lashes-out-at-russia-inquiry-and-its-overseers.html.
65 See Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 19, 2017; June 5, 2018;
March 4, 2020; May 22, 2020).
66 Federal News Service, Announcement by President Bill Clinton of Janet Reno as
Attorney General, C-SPAN (Feb. 11, 1993), https://www.c-span.org/video/?37897-1/attorneygeneral-nomination.
67 Interview by Russell L. Riley, Nancy Baker Stephen F. Knott, and
James Sterling Young with Bernard Nussbaum, Charlottesville Va. (Sept. 24, 2002).
68 Benjamin Wittes, The Surprising Loyalist; Janet Reno Isn’t a Team Player but Her
Commitment to Clinton is Strong, LEGAL TIMES, (Dec. 23, 1996).
69 Susan Schmidt, Judges Replace Fiske as Whitewater Counsel, WASH. POST (Aug. 6,
1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/08/06/judges-replace-fiskeas-whitewater-counsel/4ca08c66-62cd-4ef3-a44f-9835399ed0ee/.
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dragged on into Clinton’s second term. Then, in early 1998, Reno
acceded to Starr’s request to expand his mandate to include allegations
regarding Paula Jones and Monica Lewinsky. Nine months later, the
Starr Report was released and led to Clinton’s impeachment. Clinton
was not happy with his Attorney General but, for political reasons, felt
he could not fire her.70 For one thing, Reno had support among key
constituencies and a higher public approval rating than he did.71
Others accused Reno of being too loyal to the President. She faced
this charge repeatedly from congressional Republicans, in particular
when allegations arose about possible Democratic fundraising violations
during the 1996 election. Her resistance to naming an independent
counsel in that case led to a House hearing and a subpoena for related
internal DOJ documents.72 Recognizing that congressional political
pressure also could undermine public trust, she refused to turn over the
documents, ensuring “public confidence in our ability to make lawenforcement decisions free of political pressure.”73 Republicans were not
the only ones believing she was too deferential to the White House.
Many on the left had hoped she would build on her liberal reputation in
Florida, including her opposition to the death penalty and skepticism of
mandatory minimum sentencing. She did institute some liberal
priorities, but she disappointed civil liberty advocates by supporting the
administration in the areas of national security, surveillance, and crime
control.74
When she was accused of not being a loyal soldier, Reno remarked
that the President “expressly didn’t hire me to be a loyal soldier. He
hired me to be a lawyer for the people.”75 Even so, she exercised loyalty
in the way that she understood. A close colleague described her view,
“My job is to give the very best advice I can with the very best
information I can. But I don’t get to decide these things, and if the
president has a different view than I do, the president wins.”76
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Susan Baer, Crime-Fighter with Heart, Reno Sets Out for Reform, BALTIMORE SUN
(July 1, 1993), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1993-07-01-1993182025story.html.
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1997),
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Maintaining her reputation for integrity, Reno went on to have the
longest tenure at the DOJ than any Attorney General except Wirt in
the early nineteenth century.77
4. The Importance of Appearances
Following these norms is insufficient to maintaining public trust in
the administration of justice; also essential is the perception that the
Attorney General is following these norms.
Robert Kennedy understood the importance of public perceptions.
Kennedy knew his appointment to the Department of Justice would be
controversial, both because he was the President’s brother and because
of his own political history, which included serving as JFK’s campaign
manager in 1960. To ensure that the DOJ maintained a reputation of
independence and nonpartisanship, he consciously avoided any action
that could be construed as overtly political. At his first staff meeting, he
expressly barred DOJ staff from engaging in party activities. Kennedy
also attempted to insulate the DOJ from any hint of favoritism in
investigations and prosecutions. This was occasionally uncomfortable
for the young Attorney General. For example, he felt he had to hand off
the bribery prosecution of a State Supreme Court Justice—whose
brother had been an important early supporter of John Kennedy’s—to a
long-time career prosecutor.78 Even more wrenching for him, he did not
intervene in the prosecution of a close friend of the Kennedys who was
charged with federal tax evasion, even though he knew the accused
suffered mental health issues.79
Attorneys general may believe they are acting in accord with the
normative expectations of the office, but their actions and rhetoric can
appear otherwise. As that perception of politicization spreads, it
weakens public faith in the DOJ. The salience of appearances in highly
partisan times is illustrated by a June 2016 incident occurring on the
Phoenix airport tarmac. When the airplane of Loretta Lynch, Barack
Obama’s Attorney General, touched down in Phoenix, former President
Bill Clinton decided to drop in for a brief visit. Hillary Clinton was
under FBI investigation at the time for using a private email server
when she was Secretary of State. The story of their twenty-minute

Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General: William Wirt, U.S. DEPARTMENT
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conversation exploded on conservative news sites as an example of
secret political tampering with law enforcement, even though Bill
Clinton had been out of office for more than fifteen years and exercised
no authority over Lynch. The appearance of impropriety was sufficient
to give candidate Trump gist for a Twitter broadside, as well as fuel a
book and multiple internet sites alleging a conspiracy.80 Mainstream
news outlets initially covered it as well, leading CNN Politics to note,
“The meeting is raising questions about whether the independence of
the Justice Department . . . might have been compromised.”81
The appearance of independence remains critical in the current
partisan environment, with several actions of Attorney General William
Barr raising even more serious questions.
Unlike Kennedy, Barr has little of the political background
customarily associated with the perception of partisanship. His career
has alternated between private practice and government service,
including years in the DOJ. Further, his prior DOJ service suggests he
knows the normative expectations of the office. His remarks in his 2019
confirmation hearings and July 2020 testimony before the House
Judiciary Committee confirm this. Barr noted the Attorney General
“holds in trust the fair and impartial administration of justice” and
must handle criminal cases “evenly, based on the facts and without
regard to political and personal considerations.”82 He explicitly
reassured the House that the President had not interfered in the DOJ’s
decisions, strongly rejecting any suggestion that he plays politics or
caves in to the President’s demands.83
Yet the perception that he does persists. Hundreds of current and
former DOJ employees have joined legal scholars to point out how
unprecedented his actions are, from reversing decisions made by career
prosecutors and initiating investigations pushed by the White House, to
echoing the President’s key reelection messages, including fomenting
doubt about absentee ballot integrity.84
Initially, the prosecutors whose judgments were reversed did not
comment publicly, in keeping with established DOJ practice. However,
80 See CHRISTOPHER SIGN, SECRET ON THE TARMAC (2020). The leak about the meeting
did result in an FBI probe, since it breached security protocols.
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others in the legal community did weigh in. The case of Roger Stone’s
sentencing is illustrative. DOJ attorneys recommended Stone serve
seven to nine years in prison. Hours later, the President tweeted that
the prosecution’s recommendation was “horrible and very unfair.”85
Less than a day after that, the Attorney General issued an updated
sentencing memo that recommended only fifteen to twenty-one months
in prison. In apparent protest, four prosecutors resigned from the team
and the fifth resigned from the DOJ. Several former DOJ employees
immediately accused the DOJ of abandoning decades of independence to
help a friend of the President.86 Days later, more than 2,000 former
DOJ
employees—from
both
Republican
and
Democratic
administrations—published an open letter calling on Barr to resign.
The letter explained, “It is unheard of for the Department’s top leaders
to overrule line prosecutors, who are following established polices, in
order to give preferential treatment to a close associate of the
President.”87 Another open letter was posted by former DOJ employees
after Barr appeared to be involved in clearing protestors from Lafayette
Square in June 2020. About 1,260 called on the DOJ’s Inspector
General to investigate if “the Attorney General or any other DOJ
employee has directly participated in actions that have deprived
Americans of their constitutional rights.”88 Resignations by more
prosecutors in the Fall of 2020 led to further reproach by the legal
community. Two former top DOJ attorneys wrote, “A hallmark of the
department . . . is its tradition of political independence, forged over
decades since its creation in 1870. Neither of us ever heard of career
civil servants resigning because they believed the [A]ttorney [G]eneral

85 John Kruzel, DOJ Lawyers Resign En Masse Over Roger Stone Sentencing, THE HILL
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87 Former DOJ Officials Call on U.S. Attorney General Barr to Resign, REUTERS (Feb.
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More than 2,000 Former Prosecutors and Other DOJ Officials Call on Bill Barr to Resign,
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was acting politically.”89 When a U.S. Attorney resigned a few weeks
later, he broke the customary silence to accuse the Attorney General of
“slavish obedience to Donald Trump’s will in his selective meddling
with the criminal justice system [.]”90 In late October 2020, twenty more
former U.S. Attorneys publicly criticized the politicization of the DOJ;
they had served in every Republican administration since Eisenhower.91
The sheer number of former DOJ employees speaking out is
unprecedented, more so because of the discretion drilled into federal
prosecutors. Nor can their concerns be easily dismissed as partisan
attacks.
For his part, the Attorney General vociferously denies that he has
acted inappropriately or politically. He sees his actions as legitimate
and even necessary. In his Constitution Day remarks at Hillsdale
College, for example, he said, “Line prosecutors . . . are generally part of
the permanent bureaucracy. They do not have the political legitimacy to
be the public face for tough decisions . . . . Nor can the public and its
representatives hold civil servants accountable in the same way as
appointed officials.”92 It is important to note that Barr did not comply
with every directive by the President, including some that might have
impacted the 2020 election in Trump’s favor.93 Yet, the Attorney
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General never addressed the potential impact that perception of bias
can have on the administration of justice. Regardless of the Attorney
General’s actual motives, the appearance that he acted improperly has
undercut key norms in the DOJ.
IV. LAW & POLITICS: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
This examination of the history and norms of the Office of the
Attorney General brings us back to the duality that sparked my interest
all those years ago. Former U.S. Attorney and later independent
counsel, Whitney North Seymour, wrote that the Attorney General is
compelled to serve two masters—the President and the law. He called it
“a fundamental flaw in the original conception of the Department of
Justice”94 and proposed dividing the functions into an attorney
general/presidential adviser, and a chief prosecutor.95 That idea never
caught on. Others have proposed various institutional arrangements to
ensure that the Attorney General, while constitutionally obligated to
serve the President, fulfills other essential obligations: to the
government, to the Constitution and to the American people as well.
Archibald Cox, John Kennedy’s solicitor general and the first special
prosecutor in the Watergate investigation, rejected the idea that the
Department of Justice should be independent of the White House,
writing, “The close relationships between law and policy, and between
the Attorney General as lawyer and the President as client, make [it]
unwise, if not impossible, to give independent status to the Attorney
General and [the] Department of Justice.”96
Furthermore, as some have pointed out, formal institutional limits
will not ensure that the Attorney General’s office is truly independent
and nonpartisan. An attorney general who intends to abuse the office
will find a way, as Charles Cooper, former head of the Office of Legal
Counsel, noted.97 In fact, removing an attorney general from the
political world would also remove the law officer from a system of
accountability. A chief prosecutor who is autonomous of the President
poses a different kind of threat, able to amass vast prosecutorial
powers.

94 Removing Politics Hearings, supra note 59, at 216 (testimony of Whitney North
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The office places a unique demand on attorneys general to exhibit a
genuine commitment to fairness, equal justice and the rule of law. Mere
words attesting to those values are not sufficient, nor is a background
that suggests an attorney general will be an independent actor. Instead,
the character of the individual matters. Edward Levi believed the most
effective avenue for insulating law officers was “[t]heir own moral
conscience and the collective morality of the Department of Justice.”98
An inescapable part of that collective morality are the norms and
practices articulated here. Attorneys general ensure that the
administration of justice on their watch will be perceived as legitimate
when they respect—and take pains to appear to respect—the
longstanding norms that have long served the public trust.

98 Senate Judiciary Committee: Hearings on the Nomination of Edward H. Levi to be
Attorney General, 94th Cong. 21–22 (1975).

